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Religious Freedom, Separation of Powers, and the 
Reversal of Roles 
Michael W. McConnell ∗  
Observers from outside the United States must be struck by the 
difference between the broadly tolerant and inclusive character of 
public attitudes toward religious exercise in this nation, and the nar-
row compass of constitutional protection provided by its courts. Af-
ter the Supreme Court’s well-known 1990 decision, Employment Di-
vision v. Smith,1 the courts ceased to provide any protection under 
the Free Exercise Clause from any application of a neutral and gener-
ally applicable law. Even before Smith, when the Court purported to 
hold that the government could not interfere with religious exercise 
without a compelling governmental interest,2 free exercise claimants 
very rarely prevailed in court. Almost always, the courts ruled either 
that there had been no burden on religious exercise3 or that the gov-
ernment’s justification (even if seemingly weak) was compelling.4 
 
 
 ∗ Presidential Professor, University of Utah College of Law. B.A. with honors, Michi-
gan State University; J.D. with honors, University of Chicago Law School. 
 1.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 2.  See generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 604 (1983) (allowing 
governmental restriction of tax-exempt status based on fundamental and overriding govern-
ment interests “in eradicating racial discrimination in education”); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 
U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (stating that only government interests of highest order could overcome 
legitimate free exercise of religion claims); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (al-
lowing government limitation of exercise of religion only to protect paramount interests). 
 3.  See generally Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605–06 (1961) (finding Sunday  
closing law did not make any of appellant’s religious practices unlawful); Lyng v. Northwest 
Indian Cemetery Protection Ass’n, 475 U.S. 439, 450–51 (1998) (holding that construction 
of logging road through sacred lands did not coerce beliefs and, therefore, did not violate the 
free exercise clause); Tony & Susan Alamo Foundation v. Donovan, 417 U.S. 290, 303–05 
(1985) (holding that requiring religious volunteers to accept a minimum wage did not violate 
their beliefs). 
 4.  See generally Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 604 (determining “eradicati[on] [of] ra-
cial discrimination in education” constituted sufficient government interest to allow denial of 
tax benefits); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257–59 (1982) (finding burdens on religion 
caused by mandatory participation in social security system justified); Goldman v. Weinberger, 
472 U.S. 1016 (1986) (finding government interest in military morale overriding Jewish mili-
tary officers’ claim to wear yarmulke with the uniform). 
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Yet, even a cursory look at the statute books, or a more detailed 
look at actual practices in the cities and states of the United States, 
will reveal that the free exercise of religion is an honored value in 
American life and that members of minority religious groups often 
are given accommodations and exemptions that enable them to prac-
tice their faith even when it comes into conflict with generally appli-
cable laws. Even before Smith, the greatest protection for free exer-
cise of religion was not the prospect of successful litigation—since 
free exercise litigation was rarely successful—but the ability of reli-
gious individuals and groups to persuade government officials to 
provide reasonable accommodations to their religious needs. The 
great value of the pre-Smith constitutional doctrine was that it 
helped persons aggrieved by neutral and generally applicable laws to 
obtain a second look from an official who might be less impressed by 
the bureaucratic imperative of enforcing the rules as written, all the 
time, without exception. 
This pattern—generous protection for civil liberties by political 
functionaries and scant protection by the courts—seems to defy our 
usual expectations about judicial review and about the comparative 
competence of governmental institutions. Basic political science 
courses often describe judicial review as fundamental to the protec-
tion of individual interests from majority rule. The ability to chal-
lenge governmental action in court gives non-majoritarian interests 
an avenue to overcome the majoritarian pronouncements of the leg-
islatures. The democratic institutions of government represent 
majority rule, while the courts in our system—or in any system with 
judicial review—are more amenable to protecting minority interests. 
If this traditional political science model is applied in practice to 
the free exercise of religion, we would expect to find laws passed by 
majoritarian legislatures that violate the free exercise of religion, fol-
lowed by court decisions protecting religious minorities. (I speak of 
religious minorities because, even though the First Amendment pro-
tects all religions equally, legislation rarely has a negative impact 
upon the practitioners of large, powerful religions. They are usually 
able to organize and protect themselves in the political process with-
out ever having to go to court. Or so one would expect from the 
traditional political science model.) And yet, when we look at the ac-
tual record of democratic institutions versus the courts in the United 
States, it turns out that reality does not conform to the political sci-
ence model we have been taught. It is very nearly the opposite. Leg-
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islatures have shown a remarkable degree of solicitude for minority 
religious interests, and courts in the United States have repeatedly—
not always, but frequently—struck down the efforts of legislatures to 
protect minority religious groups as unconstitutional. 
The most conspicuous example of this exchange of traditional 
political roles may be seen in the recent interplay between the Con-
gress of the United States and the United States Supreme Court in 
the wake of the Smith5 decision. The Court in Smith held that the 
Free Exercise Clause provides no protection against laws that are 
neutral and of general applicability.6 The print was barely dry on the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith when Congress began consider-
ing legislation to reverse that decision. Although it could not over-
turn the Supreme Court’s constitutional interpretation, Congress 
sought, through enactment of a federal civil rights statute, the Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”),7 to provide a statutory 
remedy for any person whose exercise of religion is substantially bur-
dened by a governmental act. Through RFRA, Congress sought to 
provide the same statutory protection that the Supreme Court had 
previously provided as a matter of constitutional interpretation. 
Let us consider the traditional political science model in light of 
these developments—the decision in Smith and the enactment of 
RFRA. In Smith, the Supreme Court stated that it was not the judi-
ciary’s task to protect minority religious interests, and the Court 
worried openly about “courting anarchy.”8 Accordingly, the Court’s 
decision upheld majoritarian values and preserved the ability of the 
government to ensure that governmental policy is enforced without 
the irritant of minority religious interests. In contrast, the Congress 
of the United States did not equate protection of minority religious 
interests with the possibility of courting anarchy. By enacting RFRA, 
Congress commanded that majoritarian interests should take second 
seat to minority religious interests, where this can be accomplished 
without undue harm to legitimate governmental interests. Remarka-
bly—in light of the traditional political science model—the legisla-
tion passed Congress by a unanimous vote in the House of Repre-
sentatives and a nearly unanimous vote in the Senate.9 It was the 
 
 5.  494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 6.  Id. at 879. 
 7.  42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994). 
 8.  Smith, 494 U.S. at 888. 
 9.  The Senate passed RFRA by a vote of 97 to 3, and the House of Representatives 
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legislature, not the judiciary, that was more responsive to minority 
interests; and it was the Court, not the legislature, that was most so-
licitous of majoritarian values. 
The juxtaposition of roles becomes even more peculiar when you 
consider that the United States Supreme Court subsequently held 
RFRA unconstitutional, at least as applied to the actions of state and 
local governments.10 In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Court struck 
down RFRA, calling the Act “so out of proportion to a supposed 
remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as re-
sponsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior.”11 In 
critique of the City of Boerne decision, I have previously argued that 
the Court should have pursued a more modest judicial role, giving 
greater respect to the democratic choices represented by congres-
sional enactment of RFRA.12 However, regardless of the correctness 
of the City of Boerne decision, the entire saga casts doubt on the tra-
ditional political science model, in which judicial review provides a 
backstop for minority interests against a legislative branch that is pre-
sumed to be concerned with the majority. 
Looking more broadly at this question, we find that the actions 
of Congress and the Supreme Court surrounding the Smith case 
were not aberrational. Many pieces of recent legislation were enacted 
precisely in order to provide protection for individual rights that the 
courts failed to provide. Contrary to the majoritarian principles tradi-
tionally evident in legislation, such statutes demonstrate the desire of 
the legislature to correct perceived failures of the federal courts to 
enforce and protect religious liberty. A number of recent examples 
serve to illustrate this phenomenon. 
In 1984, Congress passed the Equal Access Act13 to protect the 
rights of religious students to meet for bible study and prayer as non-
curricular clubs in the public schools. This statute countered deci-
sions of the federal courts of appeals that had uniformly held that 
 
passed the Act unanimously. Peter Steinfels, Clinton Signs Law Protecting Religious Practices, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1993, at A18. 
 10.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The Court’s opinion did not 
hold RFRA unconstitutional as applied to the actions of the federal government, and thus the 
Act likely still applies to federal governmental action. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 858–59 
(8th Cir. 1998). 
 11.  Flores, 521 U.S. at 532. 
 12.  Michael W. McConnell, The Supreme Court, 1996 Term: Institutions and Interpreta-
tion: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 156 (1997). 
 13.  20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–4074 (1988). 
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secondary schools were not a public forum where religious views 
could be freely expressed.14 In 1994, Congress passed the American 
Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments,15 countering the pre-
cise decision in the Smith case and protecting religious use of peyote 
by Native Americans. In establishing such protection, Congress de-
clared that “the lack of adequate and clear legal protection for the 
religious use of peyote by Indians may serve to stigmatize and mar-
ginalize Indian tribes and cultures, and increase the risk that they will 
be exposed to discriminatory treatment.”16 In 1998, the Religious 
Liberty and Charitable Donation Protection Act17 was signed into 
law to protect religious institutions, churches, and religious donors 
from bankruptcy courts that sought to seize contributions that had 
been made in the ordinary course of giving prior to the donor’s filing 
for bankruptcy. 
Most recently, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and In-
stitutionalized Persons Act of 2000,18 restricting certain governmen-
tal burdens on religious exercise by states and local governments. 
First, in response to zoning boards resisting religious land use, the 
Act prohibits enforcement of land use regulations “that impose[] a 
substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person, including a 
religious assembly or institution.”19 This section of the Act protects 
religious construction activities, such as the building of houses of 
worship, and restricts government control of religious property use, 
such as restrictions on whether churches are able to operate homeless 
shelters and feeding programs on their premises. Second, the Act 
prohibits imposition of governmental restrictions that substantially 
burden the religious rights of persons “residing in or confined to an 
institution.”20 
Further, within the United States political framework, Congress 
is not the sole legislative body to enact statutes addressing the free 
exercise of religious rights of individuals. A number of states have 
 
 14.  See Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. Sch. Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 
1048 (5th Cir. 1982); see also Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 980 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 15.  42 U.S.C. § 1996a (1994). 
 16.  Id. § (a)(5). 
 17.  Pub. L. No. 105-183, 112 Stat. 517 (1998) (principally codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 
544, 548, and 1325 (Supp. IV 1998)). 
 18.  Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat. 803 (Sept. 22, 2000). 
 19.  Id. § 2(a)(1). 
 20.  Id. § 3(a). 
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passed their own versions of RFRA, protecting the free exercise of 
religion at the state level.21 These state laws provide protection not 
only when religion is singled out for purposeful discrimination, but 
also when a neutral and generally applicable law creates incidental 
burdens on the practice of religion. In fact, a recent survey of federal 
and state law revealed more than 2000 different state and federal 
statutes that protect religions, and especially religious minorities, 
against various forms of legislation.22 
Indeed, the variety of forms of protection offered through legis-
lation is mind boggling. Consider these examples: A statute address-
ing meat inspection includes specific protections for kosher slaugh-
terhouses; the Social Security law includes protections for ministers 
in churches that do not believe in the compulsory contributions by 
clergy to social security; state licensing statutes include protections 
for religious daycare centers; employment discrimination laws pro-
vide protections for the hiring practices of churches and synagogues; 
Medicare and Medicaid protect members of religions that do not be-
lieve in medicine so that they may still take some advantage of those 
programs. These are just a few of literally hundreds of examples. 
The attention paid by the legislatures of the United States, 
whether state or federal, to the free exercise of religion is quite re-
markable. In fact, a comparison of free exercise constitutional cases 
heard in all of the courts with the record of legislatures in passing re-
ligious accommodation laws demonstrates that legislatures, rather 
than courts, have been most attentive to the problems created for re-
ligious minorities by generally applicable laws. Court cases address-
ing the free exercise of religion are more likely to consider whether 
legislative accommodations of individual religious liberty violate the 
Establishment Clause than whether individual religious rights have 
been violated. Consider the different pieces of federal legislation 
cited previously. Tellingly, all but one of these statutes have been the 
subject of serious judicial challenge, based on the claim that they vio-
late the Establishment Clause. For example, the Religious Land Use 
and Institutionalized Persons Act was signed into law only recently.  
 
 
 21.  See Alan E. Brownstein, State RFRA Statutes and Freedom of Speech, 32 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 605, 607 n.4 (1999). 
 22.  See James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An 
Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992). 
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However, defendants have already challenged the constitutionality of 
the Act in four different cases. 
It has been said that in theory, theory and practice are the same; 
but in practice, they are different. In political science theory, the ju-
dicial system is more likely than the legislature to be receptive to the 
needs of religious minorities or, for that matter, other civil rights mi-
norities. The practice is quite different. In practice, in a properly con-
stituted democratic system, the legislatures frequently have provided 
greater protection for the rights of religious liberty than has been 
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